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2Abstract
A considerable amount of studies in the transport literature is aimed at understanding
the behavioural processes underlying travel choices, like mode and destination choices.
In the present work, we propose the use of evolutionary game theory as a framework to
study commuter mode choice. Evolutionary game models work under the assumptions
that agents are boundedly rational and imitate others’ behaviour. We examine the pos-
sible dynamics that can emerge in a homogeneous urban population where commuters
can choose between two modes, private car or public transport. We obtain a different
number of equilibria depending on the values of the parameters of the model. We carry
out comparative-static exercises and examine possible policy measures that can be im-
plemented in order to modify the agents’ payoff, and consequently the equilibria of the
system, leading society towards more sustainable transportation patterns.
Keywords: Commuter choices, Transportation, Travel Behaviour, Evolutionary dy-
namics, Evolutionary Game Theory, Bounded Rationality, Environmental Policy.
1 Introduction
The transition towards a more sustainable transportation system is an important and press-
ing theme of discussion in the policy agenda of many countries, as the way we travel affects
many facets of our lives and has multiple consequences on our future. Recent studies esti-
mate that a large percentage of air pollutants which are responsible for global warming is
generated by the transport sector. In 2015, the transport sector accounted for 24% of the
global energy-related CO2 emissions, 75% of which derive from road transport (International
Energy Agency, 2017a). Road injuries are among the top 10 causes of death in the world.
The number of fatal accidents has increased slightly, but more than proportionately, with the
world population, from 1 million in the year 2000 to 1.25 million in 2015, and it is expected
to become the fifth leading cause of death by 2030 (World Health Organization, 2017).
The transport sector currently accounts for approximately 65% of total oil consumption
(International Energy Agency, 2017b), and the number of cars is expected to double by
2030, when their total number will reach 2 billions (Sperling and Gordon, 2008). This rise is
mainly related to the development of emerging economies like China, India and the Middle
East. The boost in oil demand predicted for these countries will more than outweigh the
reduction in oil consumption of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development) countries. In addition, the expected increase in urbanisation is likely to cause
serious congestion problems in the next decades in most cities all over the world.
The rising number of people travelling by car is a concern for a number of reasons. Among
the most cited ones are congestion in urban areas, environmental damages caused by pollution
and reliance on exhaustible resources. Indeed, motor vehicles contribute to approximately
14% of global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning, being the first single source
of atmospheric pollution (World Carfree Network, 2017). Other issues are related to human
3health. The United Nations has estimated that over than 600 million people in the world
suffer from dangerously high levels of air pollution from traffic (Cacciola et al., 2002).
Air pollutants can cause and worsen respiratory diseases (Khreis et al., 2016), and the
increasing car dependence of households is held responsible for obesity and lack of physical
exercise, which in turn can cause severe health problems.
Switching to more sustainable transport modes, less polluting and less congesting, is likely
to be an effective solution to at least some of these problems. For these reasons, a growing and
compelling need to define a more sustainable pattern of transportation has been acknowledged
by public institutions in many countries, which have implemented different policies aimed at
reducing car use and encouraging modal shift. These measures are aimed both at making
alternative transport modes cheaper, more comfortable and attractive, and at mitigating the
influence of psychological factors that determine personal attachment to cars.
In this paper, we suggest the application of a game-theoretic framework to model commuter-
mode choice. We implement an evolutionary game model (Vega-Redondo, 1996), where com-
muters living in a homogeneous urban population can choose between using their private car
or travelling by bus. The choice of these two modes serves demonstration purposes, and the
model can be applied to other modes as well. As it is customary in the literature, we assume
that agents are boundedly rational and, as fundamentally assumed in game theory, that their
choices are affected by the behaviour of other agents. As we will explain in greater detail
below, agents in our framework imitate others.
We suggest that this theoretical approach is appropriate for the subject of our study for
two reasons. First, evolutionary game theory is generally used to explain phenomena involving
a population in which agents meet continuously, and where the payoff of an agent making a
certain choice is influenced by what the rest of the population does. This framework can be
a valid approximation of certain urban populations of commuters who face similar transport
problems: they can choose the modes of transport they prefer to commute with, but at the
same time they observe what other people in the population choose, and they can decide to
adjust their choice because of it, as they all are affected by the positive or negative externalities
due to others’ behavior.
Second, evolutionary approaches represent an attempt to overcome one of the main limi-
tations of traditional game theory, as they allow to relax the assumption of perfect rationality.
As a matter of fact, traditional game theory assumes fully informed, far-sighted agents which
make their choices by solving a constrained optimisation problem. On the contrary, evolu-
tionary game theory assumes that players adaptively adjust their choices, as they are assumed
to hold limited information about the consequences of their actions1. A framework in which
1Standard evolutionary theory, as well as replicator dynamics, when applied to biology, assume that agents
meet a sufficiently high number of times, either deterministically or stochastically. This interpretation is not
suitable for our specific application. Therefore, we rely on the alternative “behavioral” interpretation of the
theory, according to which agents hold limited information and therefore make choices by reacting to what
they observe in the population (Vega-Redondo, 1996)
4people are backward looking and update their beliefs looking at the past and imitate the
others seems therefore to be a better approximation of real-world dynamics.
It is important to note that, in principle, an agent who is forward-looking and fully in-
formed would make his/her choices on the basis of expectations on city planning, fuel cost
and other observable and expected factors, but in our case agents do not have perfect infor-
mation and are backward looking, therefore they use past information to inform their future
choices. In the present context, for instance, agents can revise their decisions on the preferred
transport mode looking at their past investments and experience. For example, if an agent
invested a substantial amount of money in a new car in the past and now finds him/herself
always stuck in traffic, while public transport users experienced lower commuting time, he/she
might decide to change his/her decision and imitate public transport users.
This work contributes to the existing commuter-mode choice literature in several ways.
First of all, we advocate the use of different behavioural models to represent mode choice
behaviour, contributing to the discussion about introducing bounded rationality and social
influence in models of travel choice.
In addition, our analysis is not limited to accounting for the damages suffered by car users by
the widespread diffusion of cars (resulting in congestion and pollution), but also the negative
effects on bus riders deriving from overcrowded buses. Furthermore, we perform numerical
evaluation analyses to understand how different equilibria emerge as the payoff parameters
change in the model. We also discuss how model parameters can be affected by real-world
forces and factors, and suggest policy measures that can be devised to lead society towards
more sustainable transportation patterns.
The current work presents elements of novelty with respect to previous work in this field.
Differently from Antoci et al. (2012), on which the present work relies for the core modelling
structure, we focus on a specific alternative to the use of private car and its potential neg-
ative externalities (as opposed to a generic alternative). This allows us to provide a deeper
interpretation of the model parameters, also when, differently from Antoci et al. (2012), we
carry out numerical evaluation analyses. More details about the differences between the two
approaches are reported in the next section.
Our approach also departs from other efforts focused on a similar research question, such as
David and Foucart (2014). The latter represents the choice between car and a generic public
transport option using game theoretical approach but without making use of evolutionary
game theory, which takes into account the dynamics of the population over time. Moreover,
that paper does not only focus on the share of users adopting a specific mode, but looks also
at the level of traffic separation between the two, which is not among the objectives of the
present paper.
This paper also has implications for policy making. By performing comparative-static
exercises, we show how, following changes in the model parameters, the equilibria of the
model change. For example, we show that if the net benefit of commuting by bus increases,
5this can bring the system from an equilibrium where everyone uses car to one where an
increasing number of people commute by bus. The extent of the policy effort needed to
achieve this change will depend on the initial position of the system, but measures such as an
improvement in the fleet and in the quality of the service can contribute to such shift, as it
will be shown in Section 5 in further detail.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overview on the framework
applied to the study of commuter mode choice, both from the theoretical and the practical
perspective. Section 3 presents the model. In Section 4 we discuss the results of the model
in terms of type and number of possible equilibria, and we perform comparative-welfare anal-
yses. In Section 5 we employ numerical evaluations to perform comparative-static exercises
aimed at examining how the equilibria of the model can be modified by changing some key
parameter values, and we also discuss possible policy interventions affecting such parameters.
We conclude with a discussion on policy recommendations and possible directions for further
research.
2 Overview of the literature
Understanding the determinants of travel mode choice as well as developing methods to in-
fluence it to achieve more sustainable mobility has been the object of a large number of
theoretical and empirical contributions. In particular, efforts in different fields ranging from
sociology to economics have attempted to incorporate the role of other agents in travel deci-
sion making in different ways.
Sociological theories as the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) have been applied
to account for the role of attitudes, norms and perceived behavioural control on choices. As
an example, Bamberg et al. (2003) applied it to predict mode choice following the introduc-
tion of a pre-paid bus ticket. The influence of others was captured by asking respondents to
anticipate the reaction of their close social circle.
Empirical studies based on Random Utility Theory (RUT) constitute a large share of the
existing literature on the topic of modal choice. A wealth of econometric techniques have
been employed to study the determinants of transport choices, using data on stated prefer-
ences (SP) or revealed preferences (RP). In presence of several transport-mode alternatives,
and when the aim of the researcher is to forecast the probabilities with which each one will
be chosen, discrete choice models are typically used (Ben-Akiva and Bierlaire, 1999).
These models can account for both deterministic and random heterogeneity across decision
makers (Ben-Akiva and Bierlaire, 1999; Bhat, 2000). While controlling for both attributes of
choice alternatives and socio-economic characteristics of the decision maker, several studies
6find an increased probability of switching from private car to other alternatives in presence of
auto-use disincentives, improved level of service of public transport or travel time reduction
(Fillone et al., 2007; Nurdden et al., 2007; Vedagiri and Arasan, 2009; Williams, 1978).
Recent studies have underlined the relevance for travel behaviour of the so-called “soft fac-
tors”, like latent attitudes and perceptions (Eriksson and Forward, 2011; Spears et al., 2013)
and social networks. As explained by Dugundji and Walker (2005), the impact of the social
environment on decision making has been incorporated in empirical models in different ways,
for example by means of field variables, “allowing the systematic utility to be a function of the
proportion of a given decision-makers reference entities who have made this choice” or dummy
variables to account for the belonging of an individual to a certain group or community. The
traffic behaviour literature also incorporates effects of other drivers, for example assuming
that the behaviour of a car driver may depend on the leader’s speed or spacing (Toledo, 2007).
Game-theoretical setups have been used to describe several transport-related problems,
although with a limited attention to individual transport-mode choices. As argued in Zhang
et al. (2010), applications range from macro- to micro-policy analysis. In the macro case,
games between travellers and authorities, among authorities and among travellers, have been
developed in order to study optimal road tolls to improve efficiency. In the micro case, the
focus has been on games between authorities and travellers, and among travellers. One of the
few game-theoretical contributions concerning modal choices is David and Foucart (2014), who
study a simultaneous game in which commuters can rationally choose between using the car
or public transport. The two equations that represent the utility of choosing the car or public
transport include the fixed costs of car use and the waiting time for the public transport and
the congestion faced by each mode. Heterogeneity is modelled via a parameter representing
the strength of commuter preference for the car or the bus. Despite its simplicity, the model
allows to draw several conclusions about the existence and multiplicity of equilibria. David
and Foucart (2014) claim that, if multiple equilibria exist, the one involving the highest use
of public transport Pareto-dominates the others.
Finally, evolutionary game theory has been applied to model agent learning mechanisms in
presence of congestion pricing (Dimitriou and Tsekeris, 2009) and traffic dynamics (Yang
et al., 2005). Furthermore, Antoci et al. (2012) have examined agent choice between using a
private car or an alternative transport mode (walking, cycling, and public transport). Using
an evolutionary game model in which the payoff of each choice is affected by traffic congestion
due to car use, they show the existence of suboptimal Nash equilibria characterized by the
widespread diffusion of cars. Our model builds upon Antoci et al. (2012) but differs from it in
several respects. First, although we share its general modelling framework, we focus on bus use
as a specific alternative to the use of a personal car. Second, while Antoci et al. (2012) study
the negative effects deriving from the increasing diffusion of cars and the consequent increase
in congestion and pollution, we assume here that also an increased number of bus commuters
7may harm bus users, as a consequence of bus overcrowding. In our view, this is particularly
important since high levels of crowding is often reported as one of the main reasons not to
use public transports (e.g. Mazzulla and Eboli, 2006), which can induce commuters to travel
by car, although this increases traffic congestion and thus further worsens traffic problems.
Third, we try to provide a deeper interpretation of payoff parameters in terms of real-world
forces and factors that can shape them. This is possible in our case as we assume the choice
between car and a specific type of public transport (bus) instead of a generic alternative.
Relying on the existing literature, we explicitly enumerate all the possible sources of benefit
from car/bus use as well as the externalities from excessive spread of one or the other option in
the population. These are captured by the parameters of the model, as we will explain in the
following section. Fourth, we carry out numerical evaluation analyses to better understand
how changes in the payoff parameters affect the dynamics and equilibria of the model. This
allows us to get a better understanding of the potential effects of policy interventions.
3 The model
We model individual transport-mode choices in a large population of identical commuters
endowed with the same strategy set and payoffs. At each time t, each commuter chooses
between driving a car or traveling by bus. In order to make comparisons easier, we follow
Antoci et al. (2012)’s notation2 and denote with A the choice of the agent who uses the car,
and with B the choice of the agent who decides to take the bus. Let x(t) be the share of the
population choosing A.
The payoffs of the two strategies can be written as follows:
ΠA = a− bx
2 (1)
ΠB = c− d(1− x)
2
− ex2 (2)
where a and c ∈ (−∞,+∞) , b ≥ 0, e ≥ 0 and d ≥ 0.
Parameters a and c measure the net benefit, respectively, of choosing the car or the
bus. The value of the net benefit of traveling by car (a) may depend on factors such as the
flexibility in choosing when to depart and how many stops to make along the route, or on
non-instrumental factors such as symbolic and affective motives, i.e. the value that a person
may attribute to owning a big and fashionable car which may improve her reputation or
image. Analogously, parameter c (i.e. net benefit of commuting by bus) may vary depending
on buses frequency, punctuality, reliability and journey time. Other factors that can influence
this parameter are the level of fares and the availability and quality of information, such as
2As pointed out above, the current model is a generalisation and extension of this model.
8timetables. Just as for parameter a, factors which are more difficult to measure, such as the
physical and social environment, may have an influence on modal decisions. As argued above,
the existence of negative externality associated with bus transport makes the present model
depart from Antoci et al. (2012) that do not account for this possibility. A similar assumption,
instead, is made by David and Foucart (2014).
Parameters b, d, and e control instead for all different types of externalities that we consider
in the model. More specifically, b governs the negative externality on car users caused by
other cars, including congestion effects, stress, air pollution and health risks. Instead, d tunes
externality effects on bus users due to a higher share of the population choosing the bus as a
transport mode (e.g., crowded buses and safety concerns).
Finally, parameter e models the cross-externality on bus riders caused by the diffusion of
car users (e.g. road congestion, safety and health risks).
Despite our assumption d ≥ 0, it would be reasonable to allow the possibility that crowding
in buses may potentially also generate a positive externality on bus users. For example, an
increase in the number of bus users may generate a reduction in the price of tickets, and
improvements in bus frequency or an improvement in the feeling of safety during the night.
This would motivate an assumption of d ∈ (−∞,+∞). Nevertheless, given the theoretical
nature of our analysis, and to limit the number of possible cases that we will present in the
following sections of our paper, we decided to limit ourselves to the case d ≥ 0, leaving the
case d ∈ (−∞,+∞) as a possible extension of the present work.
Table 1 provides a detailed summary of the possible interpretation underlying each pa-
rameter and of the related studies which have proposed and/or examined such interpretations
in the literature.
Table 1: Interpretation of the parameters of the model
Parameter Meaning Influencing factors References
a Net benefit of car use
Journey time
Gardner and Abraham (2007)
Flexibility Steg (2005)
Effort minimisation Tertoolen et al. (1998)
Personal space and privacy
Perceived monetary costs
Control over the surrounding environment
Non-instrumental motives
b
Congestion Arnott and Small (1994)
Negative externality on Stress and aggression Lajunen et al. (1999)
car users caused by cars Air pollution Beatty and Shimshack (2011)
Health risks World Health Organization (2017)
c Net benefit of bus use
Frequency Commission for Integrated Transport (2008)
Punctuality and reliability Guiver (2007)
Fares Steg (2005)
Journey time Dell’Olio et al. (2010)
Physical and social environment Wall and McDonald (2007)
d
Externality on bus users Crowded buses Guiver (2007)
caused by the diffusion of Safety Stradling et al. (2007)
bus use
e
Externality on bus users Congestion Guiver (2007)
caused by the diffusion of Safety and health risks Stradling et al. (2007)
car use
9We model the process of choosing among the two strategies by means of replicator dy-
namics (RD, cf. Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998), wherein the growth rate of the share of people
playing a certain strategy is assumed to be proportional to the difference between the current
payoffs of the two strategies. This means that only strategies that grant a higher payoff with
respect to the average payoff spread in the population.
The RD equation can be written as follows:
x˙ = x(1− x)[ΠA −ΠB] = [ΠA − xΠA − (1− x)ΠB)]x = [ΠA −Π]x (3)
where Π is the average payoff and x˙ is the time derivative of x(t)3. From equation (3) it
follows that the per capita growth rate of the strategy’s frequency is equal to the difference
between strategy A pay-off and the average payoff in the population. Accordingly, strategy A
will spread or shrink depending on whether it does better or worse than the average payoff.
The payoff difference can be re-written as:
ΠA−B := ΠA−ΠB = a− bx
2
− c+ d(1−x)2+ ex2 = (a− c+ d)− 2dx+(d+ e− b)x2. (4)
In order to simplify our analysis, we re-parametrize the payoff difference ΠA−B as follows:
ΠA−B = (f + d)− 2dx+ (d− g)x
2 (5)
where f = a − c, i.e. the difference between the net benefits of the two means of transport;
and g = b− e, i.e. the difference between the negative effects caused by the diffusion of A on
car users and on bus users. This leaves us with three parameters instead of five. Note that
the payoff difference ΠA−B is a convex parabola if the term d − g is positive, and a concave
parabola if it is negative.
4 Evolutionary Dynamics
As we can clearly see from equation (3), the two equilibria of the model where all agents
make the same choice, i.e. x = 0 and x = 1, are stationary states for the replicator dynamics
because when x takes one of these two values, it yields x˙ = 0. Any other value x¯ ∈ (0, 1) is
a stationary state if and only if ΠA−B = 0, i.e. if the payoffs of the two strategies are equal,
and no one will have the incentive to revise her choice.
We will analyze the outcomes of the model in two scenarios: (i) d < g (i.e. b > d + e)
wherein the total negative effects are more severe for individuals who choose to commute by
car; and (ii) d > g (i.e. b < d+ e), in which the opposite applies.
As it will emerge from the analysis that follows, the model admits 2, 3 or 4 stationary
states (as summarized in Tables 2 and 3 below) and is highly path-dependent, converging to
3In the one-dimensional context of the model, every sign preserving adoption dynamics (i.e. for which the
sign of the time derivative x˙ and the one of the payoff differential ΠA − ΠB is the same (Weibull, 1995))
generates the same trajectories of replicator dynamics in the interval (0, 1)
4.1 Scenario d < g 10
inner or extreme equilibria, depending on the initial share of car users in the population. We
will then compare the welfare of the population at different steady states and discuss under
which conditions the population is better off at equilibria characterised by the presence of
fewer or no cars.
4.1 Scenario d < g
In this first scenario, the term d − g is negative, thus the parabola representing the payoff
difference is concave. The following conditions hold:
ΠA(0)−ΠB(0) = f + d > 0 iff f > −d
ΠA(1)−ΠB(1) = f − g < 0 iff f < g
The dynamic regimes under equation (3) can be classified as follows:
Case (1) If f < −d, f < g and df − dg − fg < 0 then, whatever the initial distribution of
strategies x(0) ∈ (0, 1), the payoff of B will be higher than the payoff of A for any x, and
thus the system will converge to the stationary state x = 0, where the whole population
chooses B (see Figure 1). These three conditions, respectively, imply that the payoff
difference when x = 0 is negative; the payoff difference when x = 1 is negative; and
the ordinate of the vertex of the parabola representing the payoff difference is positive4.
This last assumption is essential for ensuring that the system ends up in the steady
state where everyone uses the bus, as it excludes the existence of multiple equilibria.
Case (2) If f > −d, f > g and df − dg − fg < 0 then, whatever the initial distribution of
strategies x(0) ∈ (0, 1), the payoff of A will be higher than the payoff of B for any x, and
thus the system will converge to the stationary state x = 1, where the whole population
chooses A (Figure 2).
Case (3) If f > −d and f < g and df − dg − fg < 0, then whatever the initial distribution
of strategies x(0) ∈ (0, 1), the system will have one attractive equilibrium for x ∈ (0, 1)
(Figure 3). This implies that if the initial distribution of strategies x(0) ∈ (0, 1) either
lays in the interval (0, x1) or in the interval (x1, 1), the dynamics will lead the system
to the equilibrium x1. The “pure” equilibria x = 0 and x = 1 can only be reached if the
initial distribution of strategies x(0) coincides with one of these points.
The outcomes of the model in the first scenario are summarized in Table 2.
4 The payoff difference can be rewritten as: ΠA−B = (d− g)
(
x2 − 2d
d−g
x+ f+d
d−g
)
. Being the y-coordinate of
a parabola equal to y = −△
4a
, in our case this value will be equal to y = df−dg−fg
d−g
. In the current case (d < g),
the denominator is always negative, therefore the only condition needed for determining the sign of the whole
fraction is the sign of the numerator.
4.1 Scenario d < g 11
Figure 1: Scenario d < g, Case (1)
Figure 2: Scenario d < g, Case (2)
Case
No. of
Attractors
equilibria
1 2 x = 0
2 2 x = 1
3 3 0 < x1 < 1
Table 2: Equilibria in the Scenario d < g (payoff difference is concave).
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Figure 3: Scenario d < g, Case (3)
4.2 Scenario d > g
In this second scenario, the term d − g is positive, thus the curve representing the payoff
difference is convex. The conditions on the extreme values reported for the Scenario d < g
also hold in this case and the dynamic regimes under equation (3) can be classified as follows:
Case (1) If f > −d, f > g and df − dg − fg > 0 then, whatever the initial distribution of
strategies x(0) ∈ (0, 1), the payoff of A will always be higher than the payoff of B for
any x, and thus the system will eventually converge to the stationary state x = 1, where
the whole population chooses A (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Scenario d > g, Case (1)
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Case (2) If f > −d, f > g, and df − dg − fg < 0 then the payoff difference when x = 0 and
when x = 1 is positive, but the ordinate of the vertex of the parabola representing the
payoff difference is negative, thus the curve intersects the horizontal axis in two points,
i.e. there will be two values of x¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that ΠA−B = 0 (Figure 5). This outcome
is confirmed by the fact that, if d > 0, the x-coordinate of the vertex is positive5.
The equilibrium which lays at a value closer to zero is an attractive one (x1), while
the other one (x2) is repulsive. This means that if the initial distribution of strategies
x(0) ∈ (0, 1) either lays in the interval (0, x1) or in the interval (x1, x2), the dynamics
will lead the system to the equilibrium x1; while if the initial distribution of strategies
x(0) ∈ (0, 1) lays to the right of point x2, the system will converge to the “pure”
equilibrium x = 1 in which everyone uses the car. The equilibria x = 0 and x = x2 can
only be reached if the initial distribution of strategies x(0) coincides with one of these
points.
Figure 5: Scenario d > g, Case (2)
Case (3) If f < −d, f < g and (consequently) df − dg − fg < 0 then, whatever the initial
distribution of strategies x(0) ∈ (0, 1), the payoff of B will be higher than the payoff of
A for any x, and thus the system will eventually converge to the stationary state x = 0,
where the whole population chooses B (Figure 6).
Case (4) If f > −d, f < g and (consequently) df − dg− fg < 0, then, the system admits an
internal equilibrium x1 , which is globally attractive in the interval (0, 1) (Figure 7).
5 In fact, since the abscissa of the vertex of the parabola is equal to d
d−g
, recalling that d ≥ 0 and that in
the present scenario d > g, we can conclude that if d > 0 the entire fraction is positive. Notice that if d = 0
(i.e. bus users are not harmed by overcrowded buses), the abscissa of the vertex is zero; if so, x˙ ∈ (0, 1) is the
one-dimensional analogous of the saddle-node point in a two-dimensional space.
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Figure 6: Scenario d > g, Case (3)
Figure 7: Scenario d > g, Case (4)
Case (5) If f < −d, f > g and (consequently) df − dg − fg < 0, then, whatever the
initial distribution of strategies x(0) ∈ (0, 1), the system will exhibit one equilibrium for
x ∈ (0, 1), which is repulsive (Figure 8). Therefore, if the initial distribution of strategies
x(0) lays to the left of the intersection, the dynamics will lead the system to the ‘pure’
equilibrium x = 0, while if it lays to the right of it, the system will end up in the steady
state x = 1. The equilibrium x1 can be maintained only if it corresponds to the initial
distribution of strategies.
The outcomes of the model in the second scenario are summarised in Table 3.
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Figure 8: Scenario d > g, Case (5)
Case
No. of
Attractors
equilibria
1 2 x = 1
2 4 0 < x1 < 1, x = 1
3 2 x = 0
4 3 0 < x1 < 1
5 3 x = 0, x = 1
Table 3: Equilibria in Scenario d > g (payoff difference is convex).
4.3 Comparative Welfare Analysis
Let us now turn to compute the average payoff of the population at each equilibrium point.
This may allow one to compare the equilibria in terms of the corresponding welfare levels and
help to identify the stationary states which are desirable by the population as a whole.
Notice that the population we refer to is the one of the commuters only, and the present
welfare analysis focuses specifically on their payoffs, therefore it cannot be regarded as a social
welfare analysis. Indeed, the present analysis does not consider the implications of different
commuting modes on the profits of the automobile industry and of the bus companies, nor
it accounts for the payoffs of the workers who are employed in these sectors. Moreover,
the current welfare analysis does not account for the costs that Public Administration and
tax-payers have to bear for the implementation of different policies.
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The average payoff equation is:
Π¯(x) := xΠA(x) + (1− x)ΠB(x) (6)
Applying this to the cases of the two extreme equilibria (x = 0 and x = 1) and to the
inner equilibrium x = x1 we get:
Π¯(0) = ΠB(0) = c− d (7)
Π¯(1) = ΠA(1) = a− b (8)
Π¯(x1) = ΠA(x1) = ΠB(x1) = a− b(x1)
2 = c− d(1− x1)
2
− e(x1)
2 (9)
The stationary state x = 1 is Pareto-dominated by the stationary state x = 0, i.e. Π¯(0) >
Π¯(1), if c− d > a− b or, equivalently, if c− a > d− b. In other words, the whole population
is better off when everybody uses the bus rather than the car if the difference between the
net benefits of the two mean of transport (c − a) is higher than the difference between the
negative externalities provoked by the users of each mean on the other users of the same mean
(d− b).
Stated differently, what the condition suggests is that even if everybody uses the bus (so
that the bus congestion problem is potentially maximum and the car congestion problem is
minimum), using the bus can still be the preferable choice. This is true as long as the positive
gap in terms of net benefits from using the bus rather than the car is much higher than
the negative gap in terms of negative externality between the two choices. This condition
could be satisfied, for instance, if more frequent and comfortable buses are warranted to bus
commuters, which minimizes the negative externality they suffer from overcrowded buses.
Similarly, the condition could also be satisfied by imposing fees on car drivers (e.g. in the
form of congestion charging) and using the revenues to offer season ticket discounts to bus
users. This would increase (decrease) the net benefit of using the bus (car), thus enlarging
the gap in terms of net benefits between the two alternative choices.
If this is the case, the economy will move along a welfare-reducing path in the case de-
scribed in Figure 4, while it will move along a Pareto-improving trajectory in Figure 6.
An inner equilibrium x1 is Pareto-dominated by the extreme state x = 0 if c − d >
c − d(1 − x1)
2 − ex21 or, equivalently, if −(d + e)x
2
1 + 2dx1 < 0. If bus users suffer negative
externalities from both bus congestion (d > 0) and traffic congestion (e > 0), the condition
above is equivalent to x1 > 2d/(d+e). This suggests that if the share of car users at equilibrium
is sufficiently high (that is, x1 is above a given threshold level) then the correspondent average
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payoff is lower than in the case without cars. In this case the whole population is better off if
everybody commutes by bus (x = 0) than in the inner equilibrium in which the two strategies
coexist (x = x1). It follows that - under these conditions - a shift from x = 0 towards x = x1
will reduce the overall population welfare (cf. Figure 5 and Figure 7), whereas a welfare
increase will occur if the economy moves in the opposite direction (as in Figure 8).
If two inner equilibria x1 and x2 exist, then Π¯(x1) > Π¯(x2) if a − bx
2
1 > a − bx
2
2. Since
x1 < x2, if b > 0 this is always the case. Put it differently, if an agent’s car use causes a
negative externality on the other car users, people are better-off in the equilibrium with less
cars.
To illustrate this point consider, for instance, the case described in Figure 5. If we substi-
tute the numerical values used in Figure 56 in equations 7–9, we can observe that in this case
the average payoff in the two extreme equilibria coincides (Π¯(0) = Π¯(1) = 0.1) and turns out
to be lower than in the two inner equilibria, being respectively Π¯(x1) = 0.19 and Π¯(x2) = 0.14.
In this case, therefore, the attractive equilibrium x1 provides the highest welfare level to the
population, consistently with our previous considerations on the sign of b (being here strictly
positive). Any movement towards x1 (as the ones shown in Figure 5) will be welfare improv-
ing, whereas a shift from x2 to the extreme equilibrium x = 1 (cf. Figure 5) will be welfare
reducing.
5 Evaluation results and policy implications
As it emerges from the previous analysis, multiple equilibria can arise from the model. Co-
ordination failures among agents’ decisions can therefore make the economy depart from a
preferable equilibrium (i.e. a Pareto-dominant outcome in which all agents are better-off)
and move along a welfare-reducing path. Public policies can play a crucial role in this case
to overcome such coordination failures and lead the economy towards a welfare-increasing
equilibrium.
We now carry out a few comparative-static exercises and discuss possible policy interven-
tions that can be implemented in order to modify the value of agent’ payoffs —and conse-
quently the equilibria of the system— bringing the society to more sustainable transportation
patterns. In other words, we aim here at answering the following question: What happens
to the number and type of equilibria when the values of the model parameters change? As
shown below, a change in the net benefits of using the car or the bus can generate multiple
equilibria and the population can be better-off at inner equilibria (in which some people use
the car, others the bus) than at extreme equilibria (where everybody uses either the bus or
the car). The calibrations performed, however, show that a large increase (decrease) in the
net benefit of using the bus (car) is needed to remarkably reduce the share of drivers in the
6There the values of the parameters are: a = 0.2, b = 0.1, c = 0.4, d = 0.3, e = 0.4; and the payoff difference
equation is equal to (ΠA −ΠB) = 0.1− 0.6x+ 0.6x
2.
5.1 Change in the net benefit of car and bus 18
population.
5.1 Change in the net benefit of car and bus
To address this issue we consider percentage changes in the net benefits of the two means
of transport, i.e. we first investigate the effects on the model of a growing percentage in-
crease/decrease, respectively, in c and a, independently of the kind of policy interventions
that can produce them.
Since our work is concerned with reaching more sustainable pattern of transportation, in
what follows we will focus on parameter changes that produce a reduction of car use or an
increase in bus use. A quantification of the effects that specific policy interventions can have
on single parameter values is at present very difficult and goes beyond the scope of the present
analysis. However, below we will speculate on possible policy interventions that can produce
a change in the net benefit of car drivers and bus users.
To perform our first comparative-statics exercise, we carry out a numerical evaluation
aimed at showing the changes in the payoff difference curve in response to a change in param-
eter a, i.e. the net benefit of using the car.
A reduction in parameter a may be obtained by implementing a policy that affects the
benefit of travelling by car, as discussed in Section 3. This could be obtained, for example,
by means of a higher tax on fuel, on parking, or by the introduction of congestion charging.
Parameter a enters the payoff difference through the term f = a − c. Thus if a lowers,
f lowers as well. The constant term of the equation of the parabola representing the payoff
difference is f + d. Thus a lower value of a will lower the value of f + d, shifting the parabola
downwards.
Let us suppose we are in Case 1) of Scenario d > g, i.e. the only attractive equilibrium of
the system is x = 1, where the whole population chooses to commute by car. If parameter a
gets sufficiently low (i.e. enough to produce at least one intersection between the curve and the
x-axis), this will alternatively produce one attractive equilibrium, one repulsive equilibrium
or two equilibria, depending on the initial value of the other parameters of the curve.
Figure 9 illustrates the latter case, specifying the parameter values underlying the evalu-
ation results. The solid line is the initial situation, i.e. the one presented in Figure 4, while
the dotted lines represent the curve after increasing percentage reductions in a. Starting from
a situation like the one represented by the initial setting, if the authorities want commuters
to revise their choice, a must decrease by at least 20% of its initial value. In this case, two
equilibria x1 (attractive) and x2 (repulsive) emerge, and the final allocation will depend on
the initial value of x. When the percentage change increases, the distance between the two
equilibria increases, possibly up to the point in which the only equilibrium will be x = 0 and
no one will find it advantageous to commute by car (see the 120% decrease in a in Figure 9).
The opposite reasoning applies when the value of a increases, with the obvious difference
that in this case the parabola would move upwards.
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Figure 9: The effect of a decrease in parameter a in scenario d > g, Case 1. The payoff-
difference parabola shifts downward as a is reduced with respect to the baseline case (a = 0.3)
by 5%, 10%, 20%, 50%, 120%. Other parameters: b = 0.05; c = 0.45; d = 0.45; e = 0.4;
f = −0.15
In a similar vein, we can observe the effects of an increase in the net benefit of commuting
by bus. Figure 10 shows the shifts of the payoff curve when the value of parameter c increases,
ceteris paribus. The solid curve represents the initial payoff difference, while the new curves
laying to its left correspond to increases of the value of c ranging from 5% to 300% of its
initial value. This time, being the initial situation different in terms of parameter values,
substantial changes like 50% change produce no effect on equilibria. In our experiment, the
curve representing the first intersection with the horizontal axis (which is in any case very
close to one, with x1 = 0.9) is the one obtained through an 80% change in c. The curve that
intersects the x-axis determining a share of drivers lower than that of bus riders (x2 = 0.39)
corresponds to a 300% increase of the value of c. This relative difficulty in changing the
equilibrium pattern obviously depends on the initial position of the curve, i.e. on the values
of the parameters of the model. If the system is in a situation similar to that depicted in
Figure 10, a huge effort in terms of policy is needed in order to produce changes in equilibria.
This result stresses the importance of the implementation of joint policies aimed at inducing
people to start to commute by bus, and highlights the fact that small changes in service
quality, for example adding a new vehicle to the fleet or reducing fares without improving
frequency or reliability, can end up being costly but having no effect on modal switch. This
is coherent with the literature arguing that joint implementation of several policies aimed at
providing an overall better service are generally successful.
One can provide several examples of appropriate policies that can modify the net benefit
of using the car and/or the bus (i.e. a and/or c). Fuel taxes are certainly among the most
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Figure 10: The effect of an increase in parameter c in Scenario d < g, Case 2. The payoff-
difference parabola shifts to the left as c is increased with respect to the baseline case (c = 0.2)
by 5%, 10%, 20%, 50%, 80%, 300%. Other parameters: a = 0.8; b = 0.7; d = 0.2; e = 0.2;
f = 0.6.
important and most widely implemented car use reduction policies7. Another example is
congestion charging (CC), i.e. schemes that generally imply that car users have to pay to
enter “charging zones” (commonly city centres). London’s CC scheme has been estimated to
have impacted transport modal choice by 30%, i.e. one third of those that were previously
commuting by car changed their transport mode (Transport for London, 2008). Examples of
non-economic measures might be strictly enforced speed limitations, traffic calming of resi-
dential zones, turn restrictions for cars but not for transit and bicycles and priority to transit
and bicycles. Examples of policies more precisely directed at increasing bus use by commuters
can also be economic measures, such as fare reductions or subsidies (Kain and Liu, 1999) or
non-economic measures related to improvements in the service quality of infrastructures, for
example Park&Ride bus stop facilities or increase in service frequency.
5.2 Change in other parameters
It is of course possible that, as a result of different policy interventions, other parameters
of the model will also change. As a purely illustrative example, we will show the results of
7Fuel taxes are generally seen as an effective measure, but some studies question their effectiveness. For
example, Storchmann (2001) recognizes that an increase in fuel taxes potentially implies a “triple dividend”, i.e.
a regulative, modal-shift effect, a fiscal effect and a positive effect on the public transport sector, represented
by a decrease in deficit. But the author argues that the first two effects are rarely jointly achievable: in fact, if
demand for car use is inelastic (i.e. people will not give up their car when the tax is imposed) the fiscal effect
will prevail, while if it is elastic the regulative one will, with negative consequences for public revenue.
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changing policy measures that result in a change of parameters e and d.
Parameter e represents the externality on bus users caused by the diffusion of car use. In
the presence of policies that reduce the interference of cars with an effective activity of buses,
the value of this parameter will be reduced. For example, bus lanes could be introduced, or
even when previously present, further regulations could be introduced so that buses only have
the right to use these and cars that travel along them can be heavily fined. Regulations to
reduce congestions and air pollution can also reduce externalities on public transport users
and therefore result in a decreased value of the e parameter. The effect of these interventions
is shown in Figure 11. Starting from a situation where everyone travels by car, a progressive
reduction of e moves the system to equilibria where the private travel mode is used by fewer
and fewer commuters.
Figure 11: The effect of a decrease in parameter e in Scenario d < g, Case 2. The payoff-
difference parabola shifts to the left as e decreases with respect to the baseline case (e = 0.2)
by 5%, 10%, 20%, 50%, 80%, 300%. Other parameters: a = 0.8; b = 0.7; c = 0.2; d = 0.2;
f = 0.6.
Parameter d represents the externality on bus users caused by the diffusion of bus use,
as discussed above. This parameter will decrease if policies aimed at reducing overcrowding
on buses are implemented, e.g. adding further buses to the existing fleet. The effect on the
parabola of a change in this parameter is less straightforward than in the cases seen so far,
as d enters all the different terms of the equation. Figure 12 shows the effect of a decrease
in this parameter. As it can be noted, in the cases reported in this Figure the curve rotates
so that the new equilibria are located to the left of the initial one, indicating that a higher
number of commuters choose to travel by bus.
It is important to note that this result can change depending on the entity of the change
in the value of the parameter, the values of the other parameters and the initial condition,
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and ad-hoc analyses of changes need to be carried out to explore the expected effects of policy
measures.
Figure 12: The effect of a decrease in parameter d in Scenario d < g, Case 3. The payoff-
difference parabola rotates as d decreases with respect to the baseline case (d = 0.2) by 5%,
10%, 20%, 80%. Other parameters: a = 0.4; b = 0.7; c = 0.3; e = 0.3; f = 0.1.
5.3 Comparative Welfare Analysis
The welfare analysis introduced earlier can be applied to our evaluation exercise in order to
observe how changes in the value of parameters affect social welfare. In the comparative
statics exercise illustrated in Figure 9 we start from the situation showed by the solid line,
in which the only two equilibria are x = 0 and x = 1, the former being repulsive and the
latter attractive. In this case, it can easily be shown that Π¯(0) = 0 and Π¯(1) = 0.25 so that
the equilibrium which ensures the maximum well-being for the population is the one in which
no-one commutes by bus. When the value of parameter a decreases by 50%, the system has
four different equilibria, represented by:
x = 0,
x = 1,
x1,2 =
2d
d−g
±
√(
2d
d−g
)
2 − 4
(
f+d
d−g
)
2
.
Substituting the values of the parameters and the equilibrium values in equation (6), the
average payoffs in the four different equilibria are equal to Π¯(0) = 0, Π¯(1) = 0.25, Π¯(x1) =
0.29, Π¯(x2) = 0.25. In this case, the equilibrium x = 0 is Pareto-dominated by all the others,
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the welfare level in x = 1 is equal to that in the repulsive equilibrium x2, and the best
stationary state is the attractive inner equilibrium x1, where only one fifth of the population
commutes by car.
Similar results are obtained when analyzing the exercise illustrated in Figure 10. In the
initial situation we have Π¯(0) = 0, Π¯(1) = 0.1. When c increases by 80% the average payoff
corresponding to the inner equilibrium x1 is Π¯(x1) = 0.24 and when c is increased by 300%,
the average payoff of x2 equals 0.7, i.e. in both cases the new equilibria grants a welfare level
which is higher than the one provided by the two extreme equilibria.
We can therefore observe that, with the specific parameter values chosen in our evaluation,
when there are exclusively extreme equilibria, the one where everybody commutes by car seems
to grant a higher average payoff, but when inner solutions are also present, these are strongly
better in terms of social welfare than the extreme equilibria.
6 Conclusions
In the present work, we have studied a very simple evolutionary game model to address modal
choices in terms of transportation for daily commuting and the possibility to induce people
to change their habits promoting sustainable and environmentally friendly transportation.
Our model improves upon previous studies in several directions. In particular, we describe
agents’ payoffs taking into account not only the negative effects due to the diffusion of cars,
but also the inconvenience caused by overcrowded buses, which can be a discouraging factor
for potential and actual bus commuters.
We have analyzed the outcomes of the model in two scenarios, each of which features,
respectively, three and five different cases, depending on the values of parameters. Each of
these cases corresponds to an equilibrium setting. We observe extreme equilibria (were the
whole population chooses the same mean of transport) as well as inner ones, in which people
are divided into two groups, car and bus users. The observed equilibria are path dependent, so
the initial share of people choosing one alternative or the other is very important for the model
dynamics and the final equilibria that will be reached. Our evaluation exercises, featuring an
increase/decrease in the value of key parameters by different percentages, suggests the size of
the changes that are needed to induce different equilibria, shifting the system from one case
to the other.
Although the model is admittedly oversimplified in many respects (e.g., it focuses only
on two alternative transport modes), it suggests that transport authorities could reach more
desirable patterns of transportation through the enforcement of policies that make car driving
less convenient and attractive, and alternative transport modes particularly appealing. As it
stems from the analysis, in fact, policy interventions that change the value of the parameters
may produce new equilibria in the model, in which a higher share of people chooses the
alternative transport mode rather than their car.
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In this regard, the literature provides several examples of economic as well as non-economic
transport policies that can shift the system towards more sustainable outcomes. For instance,
taxes or subsidies can disincentivize car use, although it is important to gather as much
information as possible about demand elasticity (Storchmann, 2001). As far as bus policies
are concerned, temporary economic incentives, such as free passes, are generally effective in
producing an immediate switch in modal choices, and to some extent determine a change in
habits (Fujii and Kitamura, 2003). In the case of commuting, these policies seem to be more
likely to succeed, as evidence shows that people are generally willing to re-organize these trips,
differently from other purpose trips. The same holds for measures implemented at workplaces,
such as subsidies to alternative modes or parking restrictions (Su and Zhou, 2012). Most
studies argue that re-investment of the revenues from these measures in interventions aimed
at enhancing public transportation will entail higher levels of acceptance and effectiveness.
Non-economic measures, such as parking management and traffic calming are important as
they limit one of the major advantages of driving, i.e. travel times (Herrstedt, 1992). At the
same time, public transport attractiveness can rise if service improvements are undertaken.
Examples are upgrades such as switches to rapid bus transit, interchange facilities and in
general all actions suggesting a change in the quality of service.
Although the present study provides some interesting insights on commuter-transport
choices, it should be interpreted as a preliminary analysis of this issue and can be therefore
extended in several directions in the future. First, the model allows commuters to choose
between car and bus only, but other alternatives, like rail, cycling and walking could be
considered. This would imply the definition of the payoffs associated to the new commuting
alternatives, and new results in terms of model equilibrium dynamics, producing further and
possibly more detailed policy recommendations.
Second, instead of examining binary choices (i.e. car vs. bus), multiple transport alterna-
tives could be simultaneously taken into account. This could be implemented, for instance,
by dividing the population in three fractions x, y and z, representing the share of users of
each mode of transport, and examining the correspondent replicator dynamics and system
equilibria.
Another possible way of expanding the present work consists in introducing heterogeneity
among commuters, i.e. distributing commuters in a number of different populations. This
may allow one to embody heterogeneous beliefs and latent attitudes in the type of commuter
belonging to each specific population, beliefs and attitudes which proved to be quite hard to
modify for most people.
Moreover, in this study we have attributed arbitrary values to the parameters of the model.
Conversely, following e.g. Abrantes and Wardman (2011), who have recently proposed differ-
ent methods to attribute a value to time for the different transport mode users, future research
could attempt to pursue a more realistic estimation or calibration of model parameters.
Finally, an interesting extension of our work could be considering a stochastic version of
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the model, where agents can make mistakes or experiment with a small probability. In this
way, one might better understand whether, in presence of multiple equilibria, some of them
resist to temporary or persistent small shocks. This becomes crucial to better evaluate policy
implications and the role of policy makers.
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